Legal Origins Theory, Economic Development and Competition Law – Canada and Korea by Yoon, Hyungsuk
Legal Origins Theory, Economic 
Development and Competition Law  
– Canada and Korea
Hyungsuk Yoon*
Abstract
Legal Origins Theory is a relatively recent school of thought developed by law and finance 
scholars within the framework of comparative legal studies. The proponents of the Theory posit 
that societies with different legal origins are associated with different legal rules, and these 
differently formed legal rules lead to different economic outcomes. The basic conclusion of the 
Theory suggest that common law based countries tend to do better as shown by economic 
indicators compared to civil law countries. The focus of this paper is to examine the Theory’s 
findings in two stages. First, it will consider whether the Theory can be used to explain the rapid 
economic development of Korea over the last few decades. Second, this paper will examine 
whether competition (fair trade) law falls within the ambit of the Theory. This paper attempts to 
arrive at the conclusion that different stages of economic development would better explain 
(rather than legal origins) the need and development of laws governing economic development. 
The framework of analysis is adopted from the work of Christopher A. Whytock, which I refer to 
as modified functional approach.
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I. Part I - Introduction 
1. Legal Origins Theory
Legal Origins Theory (the “Theory”) is a relatively recent school of 
thought developed by law and finance scholars within the framework of 
comparative legal studies. The proponents of the Theory posit that societies 
with different legal origins are associated with different legal rules, and 
these differently formed legal rules lead to different economic outcomes.1) A 
more detailed summary of highlights will follow in Part II, but it suffices to 
introduce their basic finding here as follows:
Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with a) 
better investor protection, which in turn is associated with improved 
financial development, better access to finance, and higher 
ownership dispersion, b) lighter government ownership and 
regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, better 
functioning labour markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and c) 
less formalized and more independent judicial systems, which are in 
turn is associated with more secure property rights and better 
contract enforcement.2)
The Theory’s findings are backed by sophisticated econometric 
analyses, adding a quantitative dimension to conventional comparative 
methodologies. While this may be a welcome addition to the arsenal of 
comparative methodologies, it must be noted that econometric analysis 
does not necessarily establish causality, and it must therefore be handled 
with much care and scrutiny. This is especially true where the Theory’s 
idea is catching on amongst powerful institutions that can potentially exert 
influence over policy choices in developing countries.3) The Theory 
1) Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins” (2007) NBER Working Paper No. 13608 at 20 [La Porta].
2) Ibid. 
3) John Ohnesorge, “Legal Origins and the Tasks of Corporate Law in Economic 
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proposes a blueprint for reforms, suggesting appropriate institutions, or 
simply less government intervention in many instances, all based on 
common law style market economy ideals.4)
2. Framework of Analysis
For the purposes of this paper, the general framework of analysis is 
adopted from the work of Whytock, which will be referred to as “modified 
functionalist approach.” Whytock argues that the Theory has “a close 
affinity with functionalist comparative law,”5) and makes three criticisms 
and three corresponding suggestions regarding functionalism (and, by 
extension, the Theory). While Whytock’s insights are used liberally 
throughout the following discussions and analyses, this paper will also 
draw on other sources to critique the Theory regarding its specific aspects.
3. Outline of Topics and Issues
The primary focus of this paper is to question the Theory’s basic idea in 
two stages. First, it will examine whether the Theory has given sufficient 
considerations to the example of the Republic of Korea (“Korea”) during its 
rapid economic development over the last several decades. From the outset, 
it is difficult to see how stronger investor protection might have helped 
Korea during its predominantly state-driven efforts toward economic 
growth. This is one of many criticisms against the Theory voiced by 
Ohnesorge, Whytock and Siem. According to these scholars, the Theory 
surprisingly lacks any analysis of exceptions to their theory. Furthermore, 
Siem and Whytock argue that the convention of categorizing legal origins 
into four different legal traditions (Common, Civil, German and 
Scandinavian) has lost a lot of its relevance.6) This is especially true in the 
context of globalization where international trade and policy integration is 
Development: A Preliminary Exploration” (2009) BYU L Rev 1619 at 1624 [Ohnesorge].
4) La Porta, supra note 1 at 60. 
5) Christopher A Whytock, “Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative 
Law” (2009) BYU L Rev 1879 at 1880 [Whytock].
6) Ibid at 1900.
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taking place at an unprecedented rate. Whytock asserts that “functionalist 
comparative legal scholars should therefore treat the appropriateness of a 
particular legal institution for a particular country, regardless of its origins, 
as an open question that needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis in 
light of contextual factors.”7) This is the essence of the analysis that is to be 
conducted by this paper. The argument here is that a set of market 
conditions, as well as legal origins, is one of the contextual factors to be 
studied where laws that purport to govern economies are concerned. Thus, 
Part III of this paper will review the literature on this issue and summarize 
the findings against the Theory, using the example of Korea whenever 
relevant. 
Second, this paper will examine whether competition law falls within 
the ambit of the Theory. Competition law is of particular interest since the 
Theory’s primary preoccupation is the formation of legal rules related to 
economic development and their outcomes. Similar to investor protection, 
which falls within the broader context of corporate law, competition law is 
an area of law that purports to regulate an economy in a manner conducive 
to economic development. By comparing the inception of competition law 
between Canada and Korea, part IV of the paper will attempt to reinforce 
some of the criticisms mounted against the Theory.8) The point of this 
analysis is to discuss how the law has been received in each country, where 
Canada is a common law country and Korea is a civil law country. Despite 
having distinctly different legal origins as classified by the proponents of 
the Theory, it is remarkable that the two countries exhibit no evidence of 
legal origins having any impact on their respective adoption of competition 
law. This paper will argue that, at least in competition law, it is the 
emergence of those problems in the market conditions that brought about 
the need for regulation, but not because one legal system was more 
favourable to adopt such regulation than the other. This in turn will be 
used to argue that in the case of Korea, investor protection was necessitated 
7) Ibid at 1903.
8) While the development of competition law in the U.S. or the U.K. also would have 
provided a good example of how competition law developed in a common law country, 
Canada is deliberately chosen so as to provide an example of a common law country that is 
considered as a small open economy similar to that of Korea. This accounts for possible 
differences in economic factors shaping competition law depending on the size of economy. 
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by the growing sophistication of its financial markets as a result of 
economic development, not that such protection would have been 
necessary while its financial markets were still nascent. Together with the 
argument presented in Part III, this paper will draw the conclusion that 
different stages of economic development would better explain the need 
and development of laws governing economic development. 
II. Part II – Introduction to Legal Origins Theory 
1. General Assumptions
The theoretical underpinnings of the Theory start with the premise that 
distinct characteristics can be associated with different legal origins, 
classified as common, French civil, German civil and Scandinavian civil 
law. In this respect, the proponents define the term “legal origin” as “highly 
persistent systems of social control of economic life,” that have “significant 
consequences for the legal and regulatory framework of the society, as well 
as for economic outcomes.”9) Although the proponents of the Theory do 
accept that these legal origins, when planted through conquest or 
colonization, might have evolved over time in their unique ways according 
to different circumstances, they maintain that “this adaptation and 
individualization, however, was incomplete.”10) What is implicit in this 
argument is that legal origins can be subject to planting and persisting. In 
other words, a legal origin can be injected into a country as a policy 
instrument. In short, it is not only possible to group countries into these 
categories, but it is also possible to determine which group performs better 
than others in terms of economic development, and use such information to 
inform policy choices. In their summary:
First, legal rules and regulations differ systematically across 
countries, and these differences can be measured and quantified. 
Second, these differences in legal rules and regulations are 
9) La Porta, supra note 1 at 63. 
10) Ibid at 8.
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accounted for to a significant extent by legal origins. Third, the basic 
historical divergence in the styles of legal traditions – the policy-
implementing focus of civil law versus the market-supporting focus 
of common law – explains why legal rules differ. Fourth, the 
measured differences in legal rules matter for economic and social 
outcomes.11)
2. Findings
As a matter of fact, relying on a series of econometric analyses, the 
proponents find that common law countries are associated with legal rules 
more conducive to economic development compared to civil law 
countries.12) This is because “the built-in judicial independence of common 
law, particularly in the cases of administrative acts affecting individuals, 
suggests that common law is likely to be more respectful of private 
property and contract compared to civil law.”13) Furthermore, “common 
law’s emphasis on judicial resolution of private disputes as opposed to 
legislation, as a solution to social problems, suggests that we are likely to 
see greater emphasis on private contracts and orderings, and less emphasis 
on government regulation, in common law countries.”14) Finally, “the 
greater respect for jurisprudence as a source of law in the common law 
countries, especially as compared to the French civil law countries, suggests 
that common law will be more adaptable to the changing circumstances.”15)
Based on this set of seemingly uncontested generalizations, the 
proponents argue that these generalizations survive the scrutiny of time 
and transformation because the beliefs and ideologies incorporated in legal 
rules spread by way of osmosis into institutions and education, and are 
thereby transmitted over time and between generations.16) Thus, even if 
actual legal rules change, the spirit with which these legal rules are 
11) Ibid at 64. 
12) Ibid at 20.
13) Ibid at 33.
14) Ibid.
15) Ibid.
16) Ibid at 39. 
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formulated will not wither away. The proponents fail to provide any 
articulated reason why this is the case (or why this has to be the case as 
they argue), but speculate that this is “perhaps because the legal system is 
such a difficult to change elements of social order, supported by legal 
institutions, human capital and expectations.”17) And the emphatic 
conclusion: “this, we submit, is what gives them explanatory powers.”18) 
The authors of the Theory conclude their paper with the following:
The world economy in the last quarter century has been 
surprisingly calm, and has moved sharply toward capitalism and 
markets. In that environment, out framework suggests, the common 
law approach to social control of economic life performs better than 
civil law approach. When markets do or can work well, it is better to 
support than to replace them. As long as the world economy 
remains free of war, major financial crisis, or other extraordinary 
disturbances, the competitive pressures for market supporting 
regulation will remain strong, and we are likely to see continued 
liberalization.19)
It must be noted here that the proponents do seem to realize that 
capitalism and markets have had something to do with what they 
observed, but it seems that they nevertheless concluded that this formed 
part of what they labelled as legal origins. 
III. Part III – Criticisms Against Legal Origins Theory
1. Lack of Exceptions Analysis
According to Ohnesorge, had the Theory been confined to its place in 
academia as a few scholars’ academic fancy, it would not be receiving this 
17) Ibid at 43. 
18) Ibid. 
19) Ibid at 66. 
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much attention and scrutiny as it is receiving now.20) The relevance of the 
Theory in our contemporary world economy is surprisingly far reaching as 
evidenced by the growing acceptance of legal origins approach in the 
context of development assistance through the World Bank’s Doing 
Business project.21) The World Bank adopted a system in which countries 
are given scores according to a set of criteria that includes investor 
protection, an indicator that is borrowed directly from the Theory.22) This 
can have far reaching effects as it can affect the policy choices available to 
developing countries by shaping the content of binding obligations usually 
attached to assistance programs designed by assistance providers (not only 
the World Bank but a number of other powerful institutions), and also 
shaping the ideas and arguments policy makers in developing countries 
use to build their understanding of how corporate law should work in their 
economies.23) 
The idea of generating policy prescriptions based on their Theory is 
fundamental to the work of legal origins scholars as they accept legal 
origins as something that is exogenously determined, i.e., something that 
can be injected into a country from outside. The basis upon which the legal 
origins scholars argue that legal origins can be thought of as an exogenous 
factor is the observation of a historical fact that legal origins (or legal 
traditions in this sense) were typically introduced through conquest and 
colonization.24) Based on these historical events, they argue that it is entirely 
possible to think of countries that were formerly colonized by common law 
countries to be common law countries today. Again, this conclusion is 
drawn from their definition of legal origins as “highly persistent systems of 
social control of economic life,” that have “significant consequences for the 
legal and regulatory framework of the society, as well as for economic 
outcomes.”25) Before getting into the discussion of why this definition may 
be problematic (as a classification and grouping issue), it would benefit the 
20) Ohnesorge, supra note 3 at 1625. 
21) Ibid. 
22) Ibid at 1626.
23) Ibid at 1624. 
24) La Porta, supra note 1 at 2. 
25) Ibid at 63. 
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reader to recognize the possible shortfalls of the Theory as a theory of 
general application. A general theory, for it to have any practical value, 
should identify instances that do not come within its scope and attempt to 
reconcile or rectify its breadth accordingly. 
One of the concerns raised by Ohnesorge is the Theory’s apparent lack 
of attempt to explore successful economic development episodes of East 
Asia.26) Beginning in the 1960’s, a group of civil law countries (following the 
classification made by the legal origins scholars) have experienced 
remarkably successful state-led economic growth, which, taken at face 
value, is directly antithetical to the core prescriptive argument of the 
Theory. Successful corporations in Taiwan and Korea provide a good 
example of this concern. To borrow the words of Ohnesorge, who raises 
this concern succinctly, “minority shareholder rights were weakly 
protected in law, but small investors who bought the floated shares in such 
corporations surely did not expect to be able to use the law to enforce their 
rights, and were instead playing the market in ways that did not matter 
much to the controlling shareholders because corporations had other 
sources of capital.”27) This gives rise to an alternate hypothesis that it may 
have been prevailing market conditions that either necessitated or obviated 
the need for certain regulations to be in place, rather than having a legal 
origin that was more fertile to spawn those legal rules. In other words, it 
might not have been the underlying legal origin that provided the basis 
upon which investors found comfort in participating in financial markets 
(and thereby developing them); rather, it very well could have been the 
development of financial markets and increased participation by the public 
that brought about the need to have legislative checks in place. 
Another concern raised by Ohnesorge is the Theory’s over-emphasis on 
corporate law at the expense of numerous other variables.28) This concern 
also resonates with Whytock’s concern. In his words:
It would seem that for a developing country with few successful 
corporations, the major tasks of corporate law would be to 
26) Ohnesorge, supra note 3 at 1629. 
27) Ibid at 1630. 
28) Ibid at 1630. 
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encourage entrepreneurs to invest their own capital in productive 
enterprises, to help them attract early-stage capital from outside 
investors as necessary, and to give them the incentives and the 
flexibility that would allow them to take the large risks that they will 
face as they try to capture markets and to grow. This is particularly 
true when the goal is export-led growth, in which products must 
compete on international markets, the competition will be fierce, and 
risk-taking and flexibility will be at a premium. None of these tasks 
is closely related to the strength of minority shareholder protections 
in corporate law, the central concern of Legal Origins.29) 
Indeed, countries like Korea had weak minority shareholder protection 
during its growth spurt but investors did not expect to use legal 
mechanisms to enforce their rights as corporations had other sources of 
capital available to them, mainly in the form of state funding as part of 
national economic development plans.30) Furthermore, it is difficult to 
accept that managerial foul play was one of the primary concerns of a 
country like Korea that was one of the poorest countries in the world in the 
1960’s with only a few corporations to lead their economy. The concern, 
therefore, was not so much in regards to how private investments can be 
protected, but was in regards to how to generate enough national income to 
go around to the general population so they can start to make such 
investments. The jump start that was necessary was initiated by the state, 
contrary to the arguments set forth by the proponents of the Theory, who 
suggest that less government intervention is directly related to better 
economic conditions favourable to growth. 
2. Problem of Categorization
Further to the criticism above noted, the Theory has received many 
questions with respect to the way in which it categorizes countries into 
legal origins. Siem argues that the “relevance of legal origins for financial 
29) Ibid. 
30) Ibid. 
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development is doubtful.”31) This is especially pronounced, he further 
argues, where other aspects of a society, such as politics, history, culture, 
religion, geography and prevailing economic conditions may be more 
determinative than merely belonging to one of the four categories of the 
Theory. Even apart from the obvious difficulty in isolating the impact legal 
origins may have on economic outcomes, there is a foundational problem 
with constructing a categorical framework associated with static definitions 
of what legal origins mean. For instance, Siem uses the example of Japan to 
illustrate this point. Although it is true that Japan borrowed substantially 
from the French and German codes between 1890 and 1900, the relevance of 
borrowed codes to Japanese law quickly waned because of American 
influence during the aftermath of World War II.32) Moreover, soon after the 
American occupation officials departed from Japan, Japan underwent a 
gradual process of “Japanization” of borrowed/planted laws, suited to 
their local needs and customs.33) The same can be said of Korea. Initially, 
Korea too borrowed heavily from the French and German codes but, today, 
it shares a lot of similarities with the American legal system, having its 
Constitution shaped by the U.S.34) In a world of freely flowing information, 
it would not be unusual for policy makers to look around the world for 
solutions tailored to their unique circumstances, having regard to political, 
social, economic conditions that shaped such circumstances. Korea, for 
instance, when it adopted its first competition law, had borrowed largely 
from the Netherlands.35) As can be readily observed, country specific 
common law/civil law distinction does not fit comfortably with how laws 
are actually formulated, borrowed and/or implemented. 
Even at the most rudimentary level, the descriptions of legal origins that 
31) Mathias M Siems, “Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law” 
(2007) 52 McGill LJ 55 at 62 [Siems].
32) Ibid at 66. 
33) Chan-Jin Kim, “The Antimerger Laws of the United States, Japan and Korea” (1984) 
12 Korean Comp L 1 at 10 [Kim].
34) Oh Seung Jin, “Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region: South Korea” in 
Overview of Legal Systems in the Asia-Pacific Region (2004) Paper 6 at 4.
35) Hanguk Gongjeonggeoraewiwonhoe [Korea Fair Trade Commission], “Hanguk 
Gongjeonggoraewiwonhoe 30 Nyeonsa Yeongoo” [The 30 Years’ History of Korea Fair Trade 
Commission] (2010) at 115 [Hanguk]. 
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are adopted by the proponents of the Theory are problematic. The 
characterizations are borrowed and accepted without much question from 
the works of Merryman and Dawson that are considered as merely 
introductory statements of legal origins. Lasser, in an attempt to correct the 
skewed depiction of the French system as the American system’s “formalist 
other,” uncovered, described and analyzed “what prior comparative 
descriptions had failed to take seriously into account, namely, the existence 
of an unofficial discursive sphere, within the French judicial system, in 
which the dominant mode of discourse and of reading proved to be 
precisely what was said to be lacking: socially responsible hermeneutics.”36) 
Of course, the concern with regards to socially responsible hermeneutics 
refers to the accusation that the French judicial system is merely 
administrative, lacking the kind of judicial considerations made public by 
judgments in common law jurisdictions. The proponents of the Theory 
would suggest that this is because civil law judges are state officials owing 
their allegiance to the empowering state whereas common law judges are 
independent from the state and therefore more likely to favour private 
property rights of the public in a contest between the state and the people. 
According to Lasser, however, “it is simply incorrect to presume that the 
official portrait’s rigidly formalist conception of adjudication dominates the 
French civil legal system; for there exists, within the system, a vibrant 
institutional discursive sphere in which French academics and judicial 
magistrats seek to produce coherent, policy-based judicial responses to 
contemporary legal problems.”37) In other words, the rigid French 
conception of adjudication would require that French judges do no more 
than mechanically apply the dictates of the legislature as automatons, 
which obviously is not a fair depiction of the French judicial system.38) 
Furthermore, Glenn accepts that there are many traces of Roman ideas in 
common law and admits that “between a writ system and continental, 
substantive law, there is no fundamental incommensurability,” suggesting 
that clear cut boundaries between common law and civil law may only be 
36) Mitchel de S.-O.-l’E. Lasser, “Comparative Law and Comparative Literature: A Project 
in Progress” (1997) Utah L Rev 471 at 520 [Lasser].
37) Ibid at 497.
38) Ibid at 473.
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imaginary.39) Therefore, this oversimplified categorization (and associated 
characterizations) of legal traditions is difficult to accept as it has been 
accepted by the proponents of the Theory, unless it is taken as a point of 
departure in order to analyze how legal systems differ from what they are 
expected to be considering different historical developments.  The 
proponents of the Theory, however, simply accept that the civil law 
tradition “originates in Roman law, uses statutes and comprehensive codes 
as a primary means of ordering legal material, and relies heavily on legal 
scholars to ascertain and formulate rules,” citing to Merryman.40) 
Considering the difficulties associated with placing particular legal rules 
into rigid origin groups as discussed above (as a result of intermixing and 
borrowing), the basis upon which the Theory is built on certainly needs a 
serious reconsideration of how legal origins should be characterized and 
classified. 
3. Methodologies Employed – Modified Functionalist Approach
As previously commented, the Theory shares a few characteristics with 
functionalist comparative legal scholarship, which can be enumerated as 
follows: (1) a quest for better solutions to social problems; (2) a need to rely 
on causal inference; and (3) a need to consider the cultural, economic, 
political, and social context within which legal institutions exist.41) 
Functionalism is perhaps one of the most well known methodologies 
employed by comparative legal scholars, and one of the key characteristics 
of functionalism is its focus on legal solutions to social problems.42) The 
basic proposition is that “the legal system of every society faces essentially 
the same problems.”43) However, the overemphasis on “solutions” is 
problematic since “a legal solution that effectively mitigates a problem in 
one society might not be appropriate for another society if the problem 
39) H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) at 246 [Glenn].
40) La Porta, supra note 1 at 9. 
41) Whytock, supra note 5 at 1880.
42) Ibid at 1881. 
43) Konard Zweigert & Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law 3d ed. (Oxford: New 
York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1998) at 34.
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being solved in the former is different from the problem that needs to be 
solved in the latter.”44) As it was argued by Ohnesorge, it is not clear from 
the Theory whether the perceived “problems” that the proponents attempt 
to address are the problems that are generally shared by different countries 
(or at least amongst developing countries). In other words, the need for 
investor protection certainly was not a problem for Korea when it had only 
a few and mostly closely held corporations. Thus, it would be an absurd 
policy recommendation to make to Korea that it should adopt common law 
style investor protection mechanisms in order to promote a deeper, liquid 
financial market that would hopefully lead to economic development, all in 
the absence of public corporations. Therefore, it is suggested that there is an 
ambiguity with respect to this aspect of functionalism, and it requires 
clarification. Whytock questions whether “function” refers to the intended 
function of a legal rule or its actual consequences.45) He argues that 
“function” would imply some specific consequence that is known before a 
legal rule is implemented.46) Further to this argument, functionalist legal 
scholars should distinguish between the rule’s intended function and its 
actual consequences because (1) simply observing a particular consequence, 
however desirable, does not necessarily mean such consequence was one of 
the intended functions of a legal rule unless the intended functions are 
delineated and known beforehand, and (2) simply identifying intended 
functions of a legal rule does not speak to its efficacy until its consequences 
become known.47) Viewed in this light, this approach acknowledges and 
allows for the definition of “function” to vary both across and within 
different societies. Furthermore, “the intended function/actual 
consequences approach would recognize the relativity of the notion of 
“better solutions” and actual consequences would be assessed with 
reference to potentially diverse subjective understandings of intended 
functions, rather than based on presumptions about objective societal 
goals.”48) To use the example of Korea once again, the sequence of (1) 
44) Whytock, supra note 5 at 1886. 
45) Ibid at 1889. 
46) Ibid.
47) Ibid at 1890. 
48) Ibid at 1891.
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common law based investor protection regime (legal institution), (2) 
development of financial markets (intended function), and (3) economic 
development (desired/actual consequences flowing from the intended 
function) does not necessarily hold, since Korea achieved its economic 
development (desired consequence) without the first two elements. 
Therefore, it is dangerous to conclude that because this sequence worked in 
one country that it would also work in another. Provided that economic 
development is at least a desired consequence (as opposed to an actual 
consequence), there is a difficulty associated with linking this consequence 
with the intended functions of legal institutions when actual observations 
do not follow. Rather, a closer look at the Theory reveals its weakness in 
establishing causation.
Another crucial aspect of functionalism, even without having regard to 
the distinction made in the previous part, is causal questions and claims.49) 
Functionalists seek to find what causes certain legal institutions to be in 
place. In other words, their endeavour is to take legal institutions as effects 
(or functions), and explore the potential causes to establish a plausible 
cause and effect relationship. In this way, if it can be demonstrated that 
having a particular legal origin causes to bring about a particular effect 
measured in terms of economic performance, it may be argued that legal 
rules associated with that particular legal origin in fact caused the effects. 
However, even a well established cause and effect relationship is only as 
good as its assumptions about where it derives its causal inference 
(statistical analysis in the case of the Theory). The Theory relies almost 
exclusively on econometric analyses, but it is a well known fact that even 
statistically significant correlation coefficients at the highest error level do 
not necessarily determine causation. The proponents of the Theory 
observed that some very well known common law countries (again, as far 
as the classification goes without the criticisms noted above) tended to do 
better in terms of economic performance compared to civil law countries, 
and attempted to explain that observation with the idea that legal origins 
might have been the explanatory variable. Ohnesorge observes that this 
could be because the Theory “may have been developed in a mood of 
49) Ibid at 1892. 
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‘irrational exuberance’ over Anglo-American economic ascendance, and by 
people committed to a free-market vision of capitalism.”50) This calls into 
question whether the relevant explanatory variable should have been 
economic ideals rather than legal ideals. Even if it is accepted that economic 
ideals are closely related to legal ideals, it still runs into the same causation 
problem. What is more, similar to the problem of classification of legal 
origins, it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to classify economic 
ideals into pure breeds, and test the Theory on that basis. In any event, this 
analysis still would not explain the success stories of East Asian countries 
during the period of state-led growth since the countries were largely 
influenced by civil law traditions, and their economies were anything but 
free markets. 
Finally, in addition to the criticisms identified above, Whytock criticizes 
functionalism for its lack of consideration with respect to cultural, 
economic, political, and social context within which legal rules exist.51) 
Whytock argues that “without understanding the potentially complex 
interactions between legal rules and contextual factors, it is difficult to 
estimate the causal effects of legal rules with a useful degree of certainty.”52) 
In this regard, it is suggested that the Theory relax its near deterministic 
understanding of legal origins, while keeping legal origins as an important 
contextual factor to be considered.53) Thus, functionalist comparative legal 
scholars should treat the appropriateness of a particular legal institution for 
a particular country, regardless of its legal origins, as a question that needs 
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis in light of contextual factors. What 
is suggested is a nuanced and sophisticated understanding between legal 
rules and contextual factors, and how they interact to affect various 
economic, political, and social outcomes, rather than contextual determinism 
or one size fits all assumptions.54)
50) Ohnesorge, supra note 3 at 1628.
51) Whytock, supra note 5 at 1902.
52) Ibid at 1898. 
53) Ibid at 1902. 
54) Ibid at 1903. 
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IV.  Part IV – Inception55) of Competition Law in Canada and 
Korea
1. Introduction
In this part of the paper, Whytock’s framework of comparative analysis 
is adopted in an attempt to compare the inception of competition law in 
Korea and Canada. First, it will briefly discuss the historical inception of 
competition law in each country. By looking at the historical inception of 
competition law in each country, an attempt will be made to identify some 
of the contextual factors that led to legislative action. Second, this part will 
discuss the intended function and actual consequences by looking at the 
legislative purpose and economic conditions that necessitated the need for 
institutional intervention. Then, the rest of this part will discuss the 
difficulty in connecting the historical development and contextual factors to 
the general premises of the Theory. It is noted at this point that 
sophisticated econometric analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and, as 
such, will not form part of this discussion.
Again, competition law is of particular interest since the main focus of 
the Theory is placed primarily on economic development (socially desirable 
outcome or, in other words, a social problem) and how legal rules can aid 
in bringing about such outcomes (legal solutions). The link between legal 
solutions to social problems is central to functionalist comparative 
scholarship as discussed in Part III of this paper. 
Any attempt at discussing the contextual factors that set out the stage 
upon which both Korea and Canada strive to achieve these socially 
desirable outcomes necessarily begins with a short reference to 
globalization. Although the phenomenon fails to take on a clear cut 
definition, even a casual observer may be aware that an increasing number 
of countries are opening up their borders not only to incoming imports or 
55) This word is deliberately chosen to reflect the fact that the purpose of this part is not 
to conduct an in-depth study of how competition law developed over time into their current 
state in each country, but to focus primarily on what relevant factors were present at the time 
of their respective formation. 
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outgoing exports but also to incoming economic ideals of free markets and 
free trade, slowly limiting the role of central planning. 
Assuming that basic economic principles hold, it is true that free 
competition fosters an environment in which firms compete to achieve 
better productivity, greater efficiency and improved product quality 
(among other things, of course). Therefore, more fierce the competition, the 
stronger the survivors must be. Those surviving firms, then, are the ones 
most capable of participating in international stages. Some scholars go as 
far as to say that a country’s international competitiveness is determined by 
its domestic competition.56) Though grossly simplified, this is why a 
growing number of countries are adopting competition laws. By 2000, more 
than 80 countries in the world, accounting for more than 80 per cent of 
world production, have adopted competition laws, “recognizing the 
growing importance of competition law and policy to maximize economic 
welfare and balancing the exercise of market power with the creation of 
increased prosperity and innovation.”57) The general purpose of any 
competition law regime, therefore, is closely connected to establishing 
economic conditions that result in economic development.
2. Inception of Competition Law in Canada
Following the classification made by the proponents of the Theory, 
Canada is a common law country. There is nothing particularly wrong with 
this classification but, as discussed in Part III of this paper, the 
characteristics associated with the common law tradition as claimed by the 
proponents give only a superficial gloss over what it actually entails. In 
other words, the classification is acceptable so far as it remains descriptive 
only. It becomes a much more complicated task to somehow translate those 
mere descriptions into “causes” capable of producing “consequences.”
The common law tradition as we know it, with judges playing the 
central role of making laws, began its development with the Norman 
Conquest of 1066. It is still recognized by the importance it places on the 
56) See Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990). 
57) Brian A. Facey & Dany H. Assaf, Competition and Antitrust Law: Canada and the United 
States (Markham: LexisNexis, 2006) at 2 [Facey].
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judge and judicial decisions today, but there are “only a few constituent 
parts of the original structure still remaining.”58) By the nineteenth century, 
the common law tradition had developed a large measure of compatibility 
with that of the civil law tradition, as the general idea of national, positive, 
constructed law received a great support.59) Legislation, not surprisingly, is 
commonplace in many common law countries today. Furthermore, Glenn 
argues that legislation in the U.S. has “assumed civilian proportions and 
often receive civilian treatment,” where legislation “receives a broad, liberal 
interpretation, in keeping with civilian doctrine.”60) The same concern that 
was raised in part III with respect to classifications issues resonates 
throughout this paper and this is yet another instance of how fitting 
countries into legal origin pigeon holes is problematic. 
In Canada, investor protection is largely dealt with by its provincial 
securities acts, and cases involving securities regulation are handled by 
specialized administrative bodies. Similarly, competition is regulated by the 
Competition Act,61) and cases involving competition matters are handled by 
the Competition Bureau of Canada, another specialized administrative 
body. This is not a distinctive feature of Canada as the U.S. has its Federal 
Trade Commission and Korea has its Korea Fair Trade Commission, all of 
which are administrative bodies somewhat removed from their respective 
judiciaries. Although the decisions of the Competition Bureau of Canada 
are ultimately reviewable by courts, it has been recognized in Canada that:
The aims of the Act are more economic than they are strictly 
legal. The efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy and 
the relationships among Canadian companies and their foreign 
competitors are matters that business women and men and 
economists are better able to understand than is a typical judge. 
Perhaps recognizing this, Parliament created a specialized 
Competition Tribunal and invested it with responsibility for the 
58) Glenn, supra note 38 at 253.
59) Ibid at 259.
60) Ibid at 264. 
61) RSC 1985, c C-34. 
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administration of the civil part of the Competition Act.62)
By its very nature, economic regulation tends to rely heavily on state 
intervention. Thus, it is not a stretch to conclude that competition 
regulation, as well as securities regulation, is quintessentially a state led 
institution. While the proponents of the Theory maintain that common law 
countries are more apt to resolve market problems with private solutions, 
in the areas of economic regulation, regulations are put in place because 
those market problems were created by socially undesirable private 
dealings (i.e., crooked private solutions). For instance, monopoly benefits 
are what might entice entrepreneurs to innovate and capture the market in 
its entirety (which, of course, is at the core of capitalist market economies), 
but a prolonged period of monopolist pricing is thought to be harmful to 
the economy because it prevents further innovation by hindering 
competition, and by preventing other competitors from putting downward 
pressure on the price. The idea behind regulating competition therefore lies 
in the notion of welfare maximization of the overall economy, based on 
mainstream economic theories. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss the details of those mainstream economic theories, but the point 
here is that these regulatory institutions are largely driven by economic 
principles built by economists, not by legal scholars. Put differently, the key 
characteristics of a common law country (respect for private property, 
judges tend to take sides with private parties, less state intervention, among 
others) propounded by the Theory has little, if any, place in the regulation 
of competition.  To put it more conservatively, it is difficult to make any 
realistic connection between those characteristics and the existence of 
competition regulation. To further develop this point, a brief look at the 
early implementation of competition law in Canada follows. 
Canada is the first western industrialized country in the world to adopt 
a formal set of competition rules in 1889. In 1890, the U.S. followed suit 
with its own antitrust act. The Canadian legislation was introduced on the 
basis of a report of a select committee of the House of Commons that 
investigated the existence of combinations in Canada and their effects on 
62) Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 
SCR 748 at para 48.
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the Canadian economy. The report did not find any evidence of 
combinations but concluded that their potential harm necessitated 
legislative action.63) This indicates that those market conditions capable of 
providing a stage for free competition were already present to warrant 
some safeguards. In other words, even though there was no evidence of 
anticompetitive behaviour in the market, the market existed consisting of 
corporations that were capable of producing the harm sought to be 
proscribed. Section 1.1 of the Competition Act provides as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition 
in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the 
Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian 
participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing 
the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that 
small and medium-sized enterprises have equitable opportunity to 
participate in the Canadian economy and in order to provide 
consumers with competitive prices and products choices.64)
It is clear from the purpose provision of the Competition Act that one of 
its primary concerns is Canada’s economic wellbeing. Moreover, it is also 
clear that the kind of economy envisioned in the regulation is that of a 
market economy. Thus far, it would seem that the Theory would argue that 
it is consistent with one of the characteristics of the common law tradition 
(in that common law countries tend to favour market economies). 
Furthermore, Canada had trouble implementing the regulation in its early 
years, which would suggest that common law countries are not comfortable 
with state intervention. In its early years, because of the close proximity 
between Canada and the U.S., both in terms of geography and economy, 
the two countries shared a lot of substance in terms of their competition 
rules. But, Canada lagged behind its southern neighbour in developing a 
body of competition law jurisprudence because of the constitutional 
division of powers. The Canadian federal legislature struggled to fit 
competition law into one of the enumerated heads of federal power as 
63) Ibid at 6. 
64) Supra note 59. 
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delineated in its Constitution. The primary objective of the Act for the 
Prevention and Suppression of Combinations in Restraint of Trade65) (the very 
first competition act) was to criminally prohibit conspiracies, combinations, 
agreements or arrangements whose purpose was to unduly prevent or 
lessen competition.66) Therefore, Canadian courts had difficulty prosecuting 
competition cases at first because of the rigorous evidentiary demands of 
the criminal process, coupled with its high standard of proof (beyond a 
reasonable doubt, compared to civil matters on a balance of probabilities). It 
was not until 1989, a hundred years after the first enactment, Canadian 
competition law was held to be within the federal jurisdiction under the 
broader “trade and commerce” power, which led to the beginning of a two 
– tiered system (criminal and civil).67) It is important to note here that the 
difficulty was associated with its political structure, not necessarily an issue 
out of common law/civil law distinction. In short, it seems that the Theory 
has little relevance in the development of Canadian competition law since 
(1) Canada did not let the free market to their own devices as they concluded 
that state intervention was necessary, and (2) its initial difficulty with the 
law was a constitutional issue, not a common law/civil law issue.
2. Inception of Competition Law in Korea
A study of Korean law is never complete without first considering 
Japanese law. Japan reconstructed its legal system in 1899, mostly borrowing 
the codes from France and Germany.68) After World War II, the Japanese 
legal system experienced a great deal of American influence as their 
constitution was largely written by the U.S. As such, some areas of law 
were changed to reflect the adversarial process similar to that of the 
American system.69) Korea treaded a similar path. Even after Korea was 
emancipated from Japan, the codes that the Japanese brought remained. 
65) SC 1889, c 41.
66) Facey, supra note 55 at 3. 
67) Ibid. This suggests that the underlying difficulty did not arise from the fact that 
Canada is a common law country.
68) Kim, supra note 32 at 18. 
69) Ibid at 19. 
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Furthermore, its first constitution was again largely written by the U.S. 
Numerous attempts have been made to emulate the American system 
whenever necessary while keeping its code system intact. Court precedents 
are not considered as law per se but, in practice, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Korea have strong precedential value. Thus, it can be 
seen as having a plethora of elements from each of French, German and 
American legal systems.
The first competition act was promulgated on December 31, 1980 and 
became effective and enforceable as of April 1, 1981. The purpose of the act 
is to encourage fair and free competition and stimulate creative business 
activities while protecting consumers, and promoting a balanced 
development strategy. The act attempts to prohibit control of market 
dominating power by entrepreneurs, by proscribing excessive concentration 
of economic power, and by controlling undue collaborative activities and 
unfair trade practices. The act stipulates: (1) prohibition of abuse of market-
dominating positions, (2) restriction on combinations of enterprises, (3) 
restrictions on undue collaborative activities, (4) prohibition of unfair trade 
practices, (5) regulation of trade associations, (6) restrictions on resale price 
maintenance, and (7) restrictions on international agreements.70) 
The Korean economy passed the take-off stage around 1967. Prior to its 
rapid economic development, the agricultural sector comprised 65% of the 
population. However, even when the growth rate started to pick up speed, 
and was heralded by some as a miracle, when the Korean government first 
introduced a legislative proposal called the “Monopoly Prohibition Act,” 
the per capita income was only about 210 U.S. dollars.71) Not surprisingly, 
under these circumstances, regulation of competition was certainly not one 
of the priorities of the government. It is noteworthy that the Korean 
government actually favoured the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a few until 1979.72) The government doled out tax benefits and low 
interest long term loans to entrepreneurs in a few leading sectors and 
strategic industries in order to gain an international competitive edge.73) 
70) Ibid at 27. 
71) Ibid at 8. 
72) Ibid at 9. 
73) Ibid.
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This also explains why stronger investor protection rules would not have 
made much difference while Korea was going through these growth spurts 
as the government owned central bank was lending to these entrepreneurs 
at a rate no investor would ever invest. This goes directly against the idea 
that a particular legal origin is more likely than another to produce legal 
rules more favourable to investors. In other words, it simply does not seem 
likely that stronger investor protection was the reason a strong financial 
market developed. The reverse seems more likely. Conversely, the 
development of competition law had little, if anything, to do with its legal 
origin. As discussed, competition regulation would have run afoul of the 
prevailing economic policy at the time. 
Kim suggests that the enactment of competition laws bears a close 
relationship with the level of economic development.74) The U.S. was one of 
the first to enact such regulations but only after reaching a fairly 
sophisticated level of industrialization. The concentration of economic 
power which resulted from the rapid growth of American capitalism 
beginning in the 1870’s motivated the development of competition laws. 
Korea was no different. While the question of economic policy may be 
informed by various alternatives, including the Theory, the ultimate 
justification must be backed by concrete social and economic realities. For 
instance, in a developing country where the level of industrialization is low 
and the economy subsistent, the whole conception of competition law is 
incompatible.75) Gongjeong Gorae Wiewonhoe (Fair Trade Commission) on 
its 30 year anniversary report summarizes the background as follows: 
Up until the 1970’s, our economy has experienced unprecedented 
economic growth and development. At the same time, however, we 
began to realize the limitations and shortfalls of state organized 
economic development policies. In order to overcome this problem 
we attempted to change the basic structure of our economy from one 
that is state-led to one that is market driven. This meant the genesis 
of a capitalist market economy and, as such, we felt the need for a set 
of rules to ensure the proper working of this newly conceived 
74) Ibid at 10. 
75) Ibid at 7. 
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economic paradigm [translated].76)  
The point here is that it was the recognition of market conditions that 
necessitated state intervention, not the other way around. 
3. Summary of Part IV
Having looked at the development of competition law in both Canada 
and Korea, it becomes apparent that the traditional functionalist comparative 
scholarship’s assumption that different societies have essentially the same 
problem is not completely meritless. It was because of the growing 
sophistication of market conditions in both countries that led to the 
development of competition rules. However, the “function” does not 
necessarily mean the same rules that produce the same consequences in 
different countries. As it was argued by Whytock, in order to compare the 
functions of different legal rules, it is imperative to distinguish between the 
rule’s intended functions and actual consequences. In other words, even if 
the intended functions of competition rules are the same across both 
countries, its actual consequences would be drastically different if the rule’s 
implementation was not in sync with their economic development pattern. 
Conversely, actual consequences (that Canada and Korea both achieved 
significant economic development) do not necessarily mean that the 
implementation of competition rules was intended to bring about those 
consequences. This would require quantifying the impact of competition 
rules in each of their economies. This, however, is not plausible as myriad 
factors contribute to any kind of measurable economic indicator. 
Furthermore, even if quantified, it would still suffer from the causation 
problem that was highlighted in Whytock’s criticisms against the Theory. 
Looking at the contextual factors that led to the development of 
competition law, however, gives rise to a hypothesis that prevailing market 
conditions perhaps better explain the introduction of legal rules that 
purport to aid economic development. It may be true that legal origin 
influences other aspects of society as it is often deeply enmeshed into any 
76) Hanguk, supra note 34 at 14.
108 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 12: 83
given country’s social, economic and political fabric. It is difficult to think, 
however, that legal institutions are not affected by other social, economic or 
political factor in a society in which they co-exist.
V. Part V – Conclusion and Further Research
The purpose of this paper was to question the Theory’s basic idea in two 
stages. First, it was questioned whether the Theory has given sufficient 
considerations to the exceptions to its Theory. Second, an attempt was 
made to provide a brief overview of the development of competition law in 
two countries – one common law and one civil law. The second prong of 
the analysis was to provide an example of economic regulation that 
seemingly had little to do with legal rules shaping the stage for economic 
activities. It was chosen to illustrate the potential error in making causation 
arguments as put forth by the Theory. The Theory’s strength is in its 
observation of empirical data that seem to suggest that common law 
countries tend to have (1) strong economies, (2) big and powerful 
corporations that undoubtedly contributed to having such strong economies, 
(3) liquid financial markets from which those corporations must have 
benefited from, and (4) regulations that maintain such conditions. The 
Theory argues that this sequence has something to do with legal origins. 
The proponents argue that liquid financial markets, without which 
corporations would hardly survive, are there because the common law 
tradition has historically emphasized the respect for private property, and 
such respect is now embodied in rules to protect private individuals in the 
form of investor protection. To a casual observer, this may make both 
logical and sequential sense. A careful look, however, reveals that it might 
as well have been the development of financial markets that necessitated 
the regulation. Moreover, the mechanism through which these regulations 
are implemented is by legislation, usually by administrative regulatory 
bodies. The argument that common law countries are associated with less 
state intervention again loses much of its teeth, as well as the argument that 
common law judges tend to favour private outcomes. The primary focus 
was given on the example of Korea. Korea, contrary to the Theory’s 
hypothesis about legal origins has achieved remarkable economic 
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development. Furthermore, Korea has implemented many legal rules 
purporting to aid in its continued economic growth, including investor 
protection and the regulation of free and fair competition, despite the fact 
that its legal origin traces back to the civil law tradition. It is worth 
mentioning that Korea is not a sole outlier as there are plenty of other 
examples where significant economic development was realized in 
so-called civil law countries. In so doing, this paper raised a question as to 
whether the inherent common law ideals (as argued by the proponents of 
the Theory) contributed to the formation of legal rules that purportedly 
provide a springboard for economic growth. The research suggests that, at 
least in competition law, it is difficult to establish such a case. In addition, 
an attempt was made to highlight some of the criticisms mounted against 
the Theory from a theoretical perspective. The Theory suffers from a 
categorization problem as the distinction it makes among different legal 
origins has lost a lot of its relevance. Also, the Theory suffers from a 
causation problem as econometric analysis cannot be determinative of 
causal relationship. Lastly, the Theory shares some of the weaknesses 
identified in traditional functionalist comparative methodologies. It makes 
causal claims without clearly defining intended functions and actual 
consequences, and fails to take seriously numerous contextual factors that 
clearly affect (1) policy choices, (2) circumstances that give rise to the need 
for policy responses, and (3) how policies are implemented. In conclusion, 
it seems that market conditions (out of many contextual factors) may have 
been the reason why some economic regulations, such as competition 
regulation, develop. 
As previously noted in this paper, a growing number of countries are 
enacting their own competition law, including such developing economies 
as China and India. In-depth analysis of what factors might have 
contributed to this phenomenon would be an interesting topic for future 
research, having regard to the issues raised in this paper. It would also be 
interesting to see this kind of analysis done in other areas of law involving 
other countries.
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